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Can U.S. Quarantine Korean Conflict?

WASHINGTON—The military reversals suffered by the United States in the first stages of the Korean police action were not unexpected—in view of the North Koreans' readiness for their campaign, the South Koreans' unpreparedness and the inevitable time-lag involved in bringing American power to bear once South Korean military inadequacy became clear. The United States can place substantial forces in the field only after transporting ground troops, tanks and fighter airplanes great distances, from continental America itself, in order to augment the uniformed men available from the American, Australian and British military establishments in Japan and other areas in the neighborhood of Korea.

Localizing the Conflict

No one need doubt that the United States, given enough time, can assemble and equip a force capable of ousting the North Koreans from the areas over which they have gained control since the outbreak of the fighting on June 24. The great problem is not whether the forces carrying out the UN Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 will be victorious but whether the conflict will remain within its present Korean boundaries.

For that reason it is noteworthy that the Truman Administration has publicly treated the fighting in Korea as a local engagement in which the stake is the continued maintenance of peace in the world. The President and his officials have carefully refrained from stating or even suggesting or implying that the Soviet

Union instigated the North Korean foray across the Thirty-eighth Parallel. The practical purpose behind this restraint is clear. The direct involvement of the Soviet Union in the Korean affair could bring on a military engagement between American and Russian forces and the total extinguishment of hopes for peace.

In areas outside Korea the crisis has created new foreign and military policy problems for the United States which themselves affect the question of whether or not the world is headed toward another general war. Incidental to the Korean intervention, the Truman Administration has begun to resist the extension of Communist influence everywhere in Asia, notably in China. On January 5 President Truman enunciated a policy of hands-off in the Chinese civil war between the Communist People's government and the Nationalists headquarters on Formosa. On June 27, however, he committed the United States to at least a temporary intervention in that civil war by ordering the Seventh Fleet to guard Formosa.

"The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area," Mr. Truman said. "The determination of the future status of Formosa must

await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations." In the Declaration of Cairo in 1943 the United States, through President Roosevelt, pledged the restoration of Formosa to China. Mr. Truman also immobilized the Nationalist forces by instructing the Seventh Fleet to see that the government of Formosa halted sea and air operations against the Communist-controlled Chinese mainland.

Policy in China

American policy in regard to China is not fully and finally accepted by other nations which have supported United States leadership in South Korea. "The admission of the People's Government of China into the United Nations Security Council and the return of the U.S.S.R. are necessary conditions to enable the Security Council to discharge its function adequately and to bring the Korean conflict to a prompt and peaceful conclusion," Indian Prime Minister Nehru told a press conference in New Delhi on July 7.

Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist Premier and Foreign Minister, on June 29 criticized the American intervention in Formosa as illegal. While the merit of his comment is subject to debate, it suggests that his government would not accept an invitation to enter the UN as long as America guards Formosa. The United States has the difficult choice of deciding whether the cause of peace will be served better by maintaining a watch over Formosa or by abandoning Formosa in the uncertain hope that such action

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will mean Chinese Communist entrance into the UN.

The United States now faces the problem also of adjusting foreign and military policy to one another. Adding to existing American commitments, President Truman on June 27 announced "acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the associated states in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces." At the same time he directed that "the United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that the military assistance to the Philippine government be accelerated."

Our delay in providing adequate forces in Korea suggests that we had already assumed foreign political obligations beyond our present military competence. Important centers of our military strength are too far from many countries to which we have pledged our support. We have no well-equipped or adequately-manned bases near Iran, for example. Moreover, our total military strength is insufficient to permit us to deal with a number of simultaneous developments requiring armed forces. If, for example, a crisis in Iran or a crisis in Greece should coincide with the crisis in Korea, we could not supply the military forces needed to uphold the interests of the West in every instance. Recognizing that difficulty, President Truman on July 7 ordered the registration of every male American between the ages of 18 and 25, in accordance

with the conscription law enacted on June 28, and the Defense Department on July 10 called for the draft of 20,000 men for the Army as soon as possible.

Views Abroad

The support which the United States has received from other nations in the present crisis implies that in the effort to keep the world at peace we can rely on many forces besides our own. All members of the Security Council but the Soviet Union, which was not represented, and Egypt and Yugoslavia supported the UN action on Korea. A total of about fifty UN members backed the resolutions. Britain has supplied naval forces for the campaign. Australia has sent military airplanes and reinstituted conscription.

On the other hand, while President Syngman Rhee of South Korea has remained steadfast, the weakness of South Korean morale and military resistance has handicapped the Western position. Former South Korean Minister of Home Affairs Kim Hyo Suk shifted his allegiance to North Korea after the fighting began and on July 5 accused President Rhee of having ordered on June 25 the invasion of North Korea.

Some nations, such as Indonesia, have treated the Korean development with detachment. The Indonesian and Egyptian governments both apparently reject the American position that the affair in Korea is more than an incident in the power struggle between Washington

and Moscow but is fundamentally a challenge to the interest in peace of non-Communist countries all over the world. Yugoslavia, unlike other Security Council members, maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea and is confronted with the possibility that support of UN intervention in Korea might be followed by invasion from Bulgaria.

A greater problem than the failure of certain countries to help the United States is the eagerness of Nationalist China to come to our assistance by supplying troops for action in Korea. Acceptance of the offer would endanger the effort of President Truman to localize the action. The presence of Chinese nationalist troops in South Korea could provoke the Chinese Communist government to supply troops to North Korea. Such intervention could induce the Soviet Union to provide troops to assist the Chinese Communists in fulfillment of its thirty-year alliance signed last February 14.

Under existing circumstances the Truman Administration apparently assumes that the Soviet Union will not go to the aid of North Korea if the military tide changes, and that the war accordingly need not spread beyond its present limited confines. In scoring United States policy in Korea, Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, on July 4 said that "the Soviet government is persisting without change in the policy of . . . non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states."

BLAIR BOLLES

Stress on UN Role Marks Shift in U.S. Policy

By acting in South Korea on behalf and in the name of the United Nations, the United States has taken a long step toward resolving the disturbing dichotomy which has characterized American policy since the San Francisco conference of 1945. For while this country, like other nations, officially paid lip-service to the UN and during the past year supported regional military cooperation in Western Europe, in actuality neither the Administration nor many Republican spokesmen showed a genuine desire to develop foreign policy unequivocally within the framework of the UN.

True, the United States contributed an important share of the financial resources of the UN and affiliated international agencies, and American representatives diligently attended all international gatherings. Yet whenever any significant issue

arose, the automatic reflex of the United States (like that of other nations) was to by-pass the international organization and to follow the seemingly easier course of independent action, as in the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, simply counting on the ultimate acquiescence or support of other countries affected. As late as this spring Senator Tom Connally, Democrat of Texas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who had been a member of the United States delegation at the San Francisco conference, opposed administration of the Point Four program by the United Nations on the ground that the UN might "chisel off about half" of its funds.

Blazing a New Trail

Now, faced by a resort to force in Korea, the United States is making every

effort to mesh its actions as closely as possible with the United Nations. No one familiar with the military resources of UN members other than the U.S.S.R. can doubt that in the Korean operation, as in any other incidents that may develop along the far-flung periphery where efforts have been made since 1947 to contain Russia, the bulk of military matériel and possibly personnel will have to be provided by the United States. It is all the more important, as has been recognized in Washington, that this predominance in military power should not be used by the United States as an excuse for seeking predominance in the political and economic spheres, thereby lending credence to accusations of imperialism.

It is not easy for a great power to submit its plans and decisions to the scrutiny and possible criticism or even dissent of

other nations, particularly when the enterprise in which it is engaged can be legitimately regarded as affecting national interest. The United States has blazed a new trail in relations between nations by voluntarily acting through the UN. Had it decided to take no action whatever, the drift toward a new neutrality tantamount to isolationism, particularly marked on the European continent and in India, would have been given a fresh impetus. Had this country, at the other extreme, chosen to play a lone hand in Korea, the short-run advantages of unilateral action would soon have been outweighed by the incalculable risks of disregarding the wishes of other nations whose moral, if not physical, support is essential for the long-run success of American policy.

Building for Long Run

This long-run success, however, can be achieved only if the current cooperation of the United States with the United Nations becomes something more than one of the old-time coalitions which have

surged forward throughout history to meet concrete dangers, only to ebb and dissolve, often with armed conflict between erstwhile allies, once the danger was past—as the Allied coalitions have so recently done in two world wars. Sound building of a close-knit international organization requires more than a temporary coincidence of the interests of many nations. It requires recognition of, and respect for, their diversity of conditions and aspirations. This means that a great power, no matter how good its intentions or valuable its leadership, must abstain from expecting that joint opposition to a given act of aggression justified it in expecting conformity by all nations with all its other objectives in world affairs. To give but three examples: India's support of UN-sponsored action in Korea does not mean that New Delhi favors maintenance of French colonial rule in Indo-China, no matter how qualified by France's concessions to Bao Dai, or would applaud attempts by Chiang Kai-shek to recover his position on the China mainland by way of a campaign in

Korea. The concern of the Filipinos over the possibility of an attack on their young Republic or over the ill-effects of Huk activities does not make them enthusiastic about the prospects of rebuilding the military power of Japan as a possible Far-Eastern counterweight to Russia. Nor does the satisfaction expressed by some political groups in France over increased American aid to Indo-China imply that the French people will unquestioningly accept a Rightist government, particularly if it includes leaders like Paul Reynaud who were associated with France's 1940 defeat.

In an hour of many far-reaching decisions for peoples of widely differing experience, the inestimable value of the United Nations is that it provides a rallying-point for resistance to aggression, from whatever quarter it may come, without making such resistance synonymous with rejection of the social and economic changes which the democracies, during World War II, held out as fitting reward for the agonies and havoc of war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

French Views Clash on Indo-China Policy*

As the conflict in Korea heightens Far Eastern tensions and dangers, the war in Indo-China enters its fourth summer with French opinion far from united on the policies to be followed toward the country that was once the richest colony in the French empire. The different parties have aired their views in the press and in parliament. There has been vociferous criticism of government policy from the Communists, approval from the Center groups and more reluctant support from the Right. Meanwhile, representatives of the French government and of the three new associated states of Indo-China—Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia—have been meeting at Pau, France, since June 29 to discuss their future relationships.

For the general French public, never greatly concerned with colonial questions, Viet Nam is fairly remote, less vital an issue than the cost of living at home or the situation in Europe. There is, however, an army of over 150,000 in the field against the Communist-led Viet Minh resistance headed by Ho Chi Minh, and continuing casualties have already brought the war very close to many French families. Recent revelations in the "affair of

the generals," the scandal involving Generals Georges Revers and Charles Mast and their attempt to make Indo-China policy by extralegal means, brought to light an unsavory picture of corruption and rivalries between politicians, colonial cliques and business interests in France and Indo-China. The affair never attained such proportions as to shake the stability of the Fourth Republic, as the De Gaullists and the Communists may have wished, but it certainly did not inspire public confidence in the government's conduct of its Indo-China policy.

Communist Opposition

The Communists have been the most uncompromising opponents of the war. They have moved from their earlier position where they urged negotiations with Ho, to demand outright French evacuation of Viet Nam. No longer content simply with slogans attacking "the dirty war" and demanding "peace for Viet Nam," they have launched a campaign since the beginning of the year aimed at obstructing the transport of soldiers and war material to Indo-China.

But opposition to the war, if still apparently the sentiment only of a minority, has not been confined to the extreme

Left. Last December a number of prominent intellectuals addressed a letter to President Auriol urging an immediate cessation of hostilities to be followed by a free and popular election, under international control and within the framework of the United Nations, to determine the future regime of Viet Nam.

The independent Left-wing newspapers, *Combat* and *Franc-Tireur*, have long been critical of the government's refusal to negotiate with Ho, as have several magazines, notably the liberal Catholic *Esprit* and Jean-Paul Sartre's *Les Temps Modernes*. The weekly, *Temoignage Chrétien*, noted for the moderation of its views, has criticized French atrocities in Viet Nam, bringing down upon itself the wrath of the Right-wing weekly *Climats* and of the then Minister of National Defense, René Pleven.

Socialists vs. MRP

The Socialist party, although it had voted at successive party congresses for negotiations with Ho, was until February a part of the government which led the war against him. Unlike the Communists, the Socialists in January 1950 voted in favor of the agreements establishing the three associated states, although they

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tended to regard these only as a step toward a broader grant of independence. A Socialist motion calling on the Bidault government to attempt armistice talks with Ho was put forward at this time but defeated. In May, at their forty-second congress, the Socialists passed a resolution urging the re-establishment of peace and the free choice by the Viet-Nameese people of their institutions and leaders. They proposed that the Indo-China problem be referred to the UN Security Council and that France pledge itself to recognize, once peace has been restored, the genuine independence of Viet Nam within the French Union, followed by the withdrawal of French troops on the request of the Viet-Nameese government which would result from these elections. *Franc-Tireur*, supporting this proposal, commented: "Unhappily, it is no longer the Socialist party which has the direction of the government. It is the MRP."

Both former Premier Bidault and Jean Letourneau, his Minister of Overseas France, belong to the MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*), which, along with the Radicals who were also prominent in the government, supports the present policy of bolstering and granting limited autonomy to the anti-Ho government of Bao Dai. Center and Rightist groups tend to emphasize the broader implications of the Viet-Nameese situation for both the French Union and Southeast Asia. A speaker at the May congress of the MRP, for example, pointed out that the Indo-China problem was not an isolated one but brought into question the future of the entire French Union. The Rightist

PRL (Republican Party of Liberty) and De Gaulle's RPF (Rally of the French People) also are determined to maintain France's position in Indo-China. Their fear is that French policy is too weak and indecisive. A PRL spokesman, for example, criticized the accord with Bao Dai on the grounds that it offered too much, not too little, and threatened the disintegration of the French Union.

With the emergence of Viet Nam as a crucial international issue, conservative newspapers like *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* emphasize the importance of Indo-China as a bastion in the West's defense against the spread of communism through Southeast Asia. In many quarters, members of the Center and the Right who want American support for Bao Dai are now making the point that as long as France must bear the brunt of fighting in Indo-China, it cannot be expected to abandon any of the essentials of its control over the area. They deplore American anti-colonialist sentiments, regarding these as playing into Communist hands. These same people argue that France is entitled to substantial military and economic aid from the West, notably the United States. Of such aid, they would like a good deal more than they have so far received. They are waiting to see what the accelerated military assistance pledged by President Truman on June 27 will contribute to the French forces fighting in Indo-China.

ELLEN HAMMER

(Miss Hammer is a member of the Yale Institute of International Studies. She spent from August 1949 to January 1950 in France completing a study on Indo-China to be published by the Institute of Pacific Relations.)

News in the Making

EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION: A tentative agreement to organize a European Payments Union was signed in Paris on July 7 by eighteen member states of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Although precise details of the new payments mechanism are lacking, the accord is expected to mark a decisive step toward the achievement of freer trade and currency convertibility. Britain's agreement to participate augurs well for the union's future effectiveness.

POOL TALKS CONTINUE: Despite the French cabinet crisis which dates back to the fall of the Bidault government on June 24, discussions on the Schuman proposal for merging European coal and steel resources continue. While the French have urged the immediate creation of a supranational council, it appears as if the treaty of acceptance will spell out precise details of the plan, in addition to establishing the high authority.

ARAB LEAGUE SPLIT: The prospects for closer Arab unity deteriorated as the Korean crisis produced another rift in the Arab League, already foundering over differences regarding Palestine. Egypt has hoped for Arab solidarity in adhering to neutrality in what it regards as simply a struggle between two power coalitions. But the Fertile Crescent countries—Syria, Lebanon and Iraq—as well as Saudi Arabia consider the UN action on Korea an international effort to curb aggression and have accordingly supported a precedent which might some day prove important for their own defense.

BRITISH POLL POSTPONED: Domestic developments, as well as the Korean crisis, appear to have pushed a new general election in Britain farther into the future. Despite the Labor government's precarious majority, the Conservatives are reluctant to force a new test, which might only duplicate the indecisive results of last February. Labor, on its part, seems reconciled to delaying the nationalization of the iron and steel industry in order to prolong the electoral truce.

FPA Bookshelf

Arab Refugees: A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities, by S. G. Thicknesse. London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949. \$1.00.

This brief report presents the findings of a Chatham House study group, giving an analysis of the origins and present status of the refugee problem and discussing the possibilities of resettlement and repatriation.

Contemporary International Relations, 1949-1950, edited by Norman J. Padelford. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949. \$2.50.

Although prepared mainly for the use of college courses in international affairs, this first volume in a new series of readings should prove of interest to the general public as well. Seventeen useful maps and charts are included.

Burmese Days, by George Orwell. New York, Harcourt, 1950. \$3.00.

In this novel, first published in 1934, the late author of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* presents a devastating picture of conditions under British rule in Burma.

A Hook in Leviathan: A Critical Interpretation of the Hoover Commission Report, by Bradley D. Nash and Cornelius Lynde. New York, Macmillan, 1950. \$3.00.

A concise summary and discussion of the chief recommendations—including those on foreign relations and national defense—of the President's Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, as well as some remarks about the prospects for their implementation.

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